upported." "Rebellion Records," vol. xxi., page 47.

Is the theory of a misunderstanding of orders tenable? The records show
that on the 11th of December, two days before the battle, Burnside
ordered his division commanders to so dispose their troops as to bring
them within easy reach of Fredericksburg, and that on that day at twelve
o'clock noon these officers were ordered to meet him personally at his
head-quarters for final instructions. There are no records of what those
instructions were, but is it credible that either general retired from
that conference with a misunderstanding as to the plan of battle or of
his own part in it? Certain it is that neither Sumner nor Hooker
misunderstood.

And the excuse said to have been made by Franklin, that he did not deem
the attack on the left practicable, is not consistent with the idea of
misunderstanding. Otherwise, why did he attack at all? General Halleck's
guarded language clearly indicates where he placed the responsibility
for that disaster, and that he did not credit the "misunderstanding of
orders" theory. It is plainly evident Burnside did not accept that
excuse, as appears from his celebrated Order No. 8, issued a month
later, relieving Franklin, Smith, Newton, Cochran, and Ferrero, and
stating as his reason that "it being evident that these officers can be
of no further service to this army,"--the first named being the
commander of the left grand division, the second the commander of the
Sixth Corps, and the others subordinate commanders in that wing of the
army. General Burnside explained to the Committee on the Conduct of the
War[F] that in asking the President to approve this order, and making
that a condition upon which he would consent to remain at the head of
the army, he had explicitly stated, "that was the only condition on
which he could command the Army of the Potomac." In other words, he
could not command that army with those officers as his subordinates. The
inference that there had been insubordination is inevitable. It was the
current belief amongst us officers of the army that the battle of
Fredericksburg had been lost through a want of hearty co-operation, if
not direct disobedience of orders, on the part of the officer commanding
on the left that day, and some of his subordinates, and that this was
due to a spirit of jealousy. McClellan had but recently been removed
from the command of the army, and the officers relieved were strong
personal frie