icy,
the Government avoids a discussion with Austria and Germany. In order
to render service to Austria the Government is courting Turkey,
provoking Russia through its action and its press, avoids the
constitution of a council of State demanded by the opposition, and
objects to the formation of a Ministry in which all the political
parties were to be represented. Perhaps the Government would go even
further, but it is prevented from doing so, on one hand by Rumania,
who maintained a puzzling position, and the probable surprises that
her "friendly" Turkey has in store, and on the other by the explicit
and general unwillingness of the Bulgarian people to jeopardize its
existence through adventurous actions that are so contrary to its
national character and sentiments. The result of these contradictory
inclinations and influences is shown in our present political
weakness, which I am afraid will be fruitless in the end.

What is to be expected from this policy? In case of victory of the
Triple Entente, Bulgaria can hope for nothing good. If the Dual
Alliance is victorious we shall have certain compensations that to my
deep conviction will be far from satisfying our national aspirations.
The Austro-German alliance, first of all, will think of itself; that
is to say, to realize the greatest ideals of pan-Germanism, the
debouching of Austria in the Aegean Sea through Saloniki, which
necessarily comprises the occupation by Austria of all Macedonia west
of the Vardar. In the second place, Turkey will have to be compensated
and strengthened, as in the future her army will be a more obedient
organ in the hands of German diplomacy and more amenable than Slav
Bulgaria, whose troops, in the opinion of the most prominent German
papers, cannot fight the Russians, while Turkey at any time is ready
to serve Germany. But Turkey can be compensated in Europe only at the
expense of Bulgarian Thrace. To Bulgaria will be given, at most,
Istip, Kotchana, Radovich, Serres Drama, and Cavalla to make good the
losses in Thrace.

To obtain such a meagre result, the Government of Bulgaria maintains a
policy contrary to popular sentiment and to the racial bonds of the
people, and a policy contrary to the further interests of Bulgaria,
which are incompatible with the building up of a strong Turkey in the
Balkans, a Turkey that would be the bulwark of Germany. The most
essential part of it is that this policy is based on a most
improbable hypothesis