urman, and is said to be carefully
preserved in the Treasury. The statement rests on no very sure
foundation, but if true the work may yet thrill the audience of the
English-speaking world. But even without its aid the main facts of the
siege of Khartoum, down at all events to the 14th December, when
Gordon's own diary stops, are sufficiently well known for all the
purposes of history.

At a very early stage of the siege General Gordon determined to try
the metal of his troops, and the experiment succeeded to such a
perfect extent that there was never any necessity to repeat it. On
16th March, when only irregular levies and detached bodies of
tribesmen were in the vicinity of Khartoum, he sent out a force of
nearly 1000 men, chiefly Bashi-Bazouks, but also some regulars, with a
fieldpiece and supported by two steamers. The force started at eight
in the morning, under the command of Colonel Stewart, and landed at
Halfiyeh, some miles down the stream on the right bank of the Nile.
Here the rebels had established a sort of fortified position, which it
was desirable to destroy, if it could be done without too much loss.
The troops were accordingly drawn up for the attack, and the gun and
infantry fire commenced to cover the advance. At this moment about
sixty rebel horsemen came out from behind the stockade and charged the
Bashi-Bazouks, who fired one volley and fled. The horsemen then
charged the infantry drawn up in square, which they broke, and the
retreat to the river began at a run. Discouraging as this was for a
force of all arms to retire before a few horsemen one-twentieth its
number, the disaster was rendered worse and more disheartening by the
conduct of the men, who absolutely refused to fight, marching along
with shouldered arms without firing a shot, while the horsemen picked
off all who straggled from the column. The gun, a considerable
quantity of ammunition, and about sixty men represented the loss of
Gordon's force; the rebels are not supposed to have lost a single man.
"Nothing could be more dismal than seeing these horsemen, and some men
even on camels, pursuing close to troops who with shouldered arms
plodded their way back." Thus wrote Gordon of the men to whom he had
to trust for a successful defence of Khartoum. His most recent
experience confirmed his old opinion, that the Egyptian and Arab
troops were useless even when fighting to save their own lives, and he
could only rely on the very small body