t showed less than a child's suspicion, and were
massacred at the very moment they felt sure of safety. It was a cruel
fate, and a harsh Nemesis speedily befell them for doing perhaps the
one unworthy thing of their lives--leaving their solitary companion to
face the tenfold dangers by which he would be beset. But it cannot be
allowed any longer that the onus of this matter should rest in any way
on Gordon. They went because they wanted to go, and he, knowing well
that men with such thoughts would be of no use to him ("you can do
nothing here") let them go, and even encouraged them to do so. Under
the circumstances he preferred to be alone. Colonel Donald Stewart was
a personal friend of mine, and a man whose courage in the ordinary
sense of the word could not be aspersed, but there cannot be two
opinions that he above all the others should not have left his
brother-in-arms alone in Khartoum.

After their departure Gordon had to superintend everything himself,
and to resort to every means of husbanding the limited supply of
provisions he had left. He had also to anticipate a more vigorous
attack, for the Mahdi must quickly learn of the departure of the
steamers, the bombardment of Berber, and the favourable chance thus
provided for the capture of Khartoum. Nor was this the worst, for on
the occurrence of the disaster the Mahdi was promptly informed of the
loss of the _Abbas_ and the murder of the Europeans, and it was he
himself who sent in to Gordon the news of the catastrophe, with so
complete a list of the papers on the _Abbas_ as left no ground for
hope or disbelief. Unfortunately, before this bad news reached Gordon,
he had again, on 30th September, sent down to Shendy three
steamers--the _Talataween_, the _Mansourah_, and _Saphia_, with
troops on board, and the gallant Cassim-el-Mousse, there to await the
arrival of the relieving force. He somewhat later reinforced this
squadron with the _Bordeen_; and although one or two of these boats
returned occasionally to Khartoum, the rest remained permanently at
Shendy, and when the English troops reached the Nile opposite that
place all five were waiting them. Without entering too closely into
details, it is consequently correct to say that during the most
critical part of the siege Gordon deprived himself of the co-operation
of these vessels, each of which he valued at 2000 men, simply and
solely because he believed that reinforcements were close at hand, and
that some