t was then quite impossible for the
steamers to cover the ninety-five miles to Khartoum in time. Moreover,
the Nile had, by this time, sunk to such a point of shallowness that
navigation was specially slow and even dangerous. The Shabloka
cataract was passed at 3 P.M. on the afternoon of Sunday; then the
_Bordeen_ ran on a rock, and was not got clear till 9 P.M. on the
fatal 26th. On the 27th, Halfiyeh, eight miles from Khartoum, was
reached, and the Arabs along the banks shouted out that Gordon was
killed and Khartoum had fallen. Still Sir Charles Wilson went on past
Tuti Island, until he made sure that Khartoum had fallen and was in
the hands of the dervishes. Then he ordered full steam down stream
under as hot a fire as he ever wished to experience, Gordon's black
gunners working like demons at their guns. On the 29th the
_Talataween_ ran on a rock and sank, its crew being taken on board the
_Bordeen_. Two days later the _Bordeen_ shared the same fate, but the
whole party was finally saved on the 4th February by a third steamer,
brought up by Lord Charles Beresford. But these matters, and the
subsequent progress of the Expedition which had so ignominiously
failed, have no interest for the reader of Gordon's life. It failed to
accomplish the object which alone justified its being sent, and, it
must be allowed, that it accepted its failure in a very tame and
spiritless manner. Even at the moment of the British troops turning
their backs on the goal which they had not won, the fate of Gordon
himself was unknown, although there could be no doubt as to the main
fact that the protracted siege of Khartoum had terminated in its
capture by the cruel and savage foe, whom it, or rather Gordon, had so
long defied.

I have referred to the official letter addressed to General Gordon, of
which Sir Charles Wilson was the bearer. That letter has never been
published, and it is perhaps well for its authors that it has not
been, for, however softened down its language was by Lord Wolseley's
intercession, it was an order to General Gordon to resign the command
at Khartoum, and to leave that place without a moment's delay. Had it
been delivered and obeyed (as it might have been, because Gordon's
strength would probably have collapsed at the sight of English
soldiers after his long incarceration), the next official step would
have been to censure him for having remained at Khartoum against
orders. Thus would the primary, and, indeed, sol