troops at the latest would arrive before the end of November
1884. As Gordon himself repeatedly said, it would have been far more
just if the Government had told him in March, when he first demanded
reinforcements as a right, that he must shift for himself. Then he
would have kept these boats by him, and triumphantly fought his way in
them to the Equator. But his trust in the Government, notwithstanding
all his experience, led him to weaken his own position in the hope of
facilitating their movements, and he found their aid a broken reed. In
only one passage of his journal does Gordon give expression to this
view, although it was always present to his mind:--"Truly the
indecision of our Government has been, from a military point of view,
a very great bore, for we never could act as if independent; there was
always the chance of their taking action, which hampered us." But in
the telegrams to Sir Evelyn Baring and Mr Egerton, which the
Government never dared to publish, and which are still an official
secret, he laid great stress on this point, and on Sir Evelyn Baring's
message forbidding him to retire to the Equator, so that, if he sought
safety in that direction, he would be indictable on a charge of
desertion.

The various positions at Khartoum held by Gordon's force may be
briefly described. First, the town itself, on the left bank of the
Blue Nile, but stretching almost across to the right bank of the White
Nile, protected on the land side by a wall, in front of which was the
triple line of mines, and on the water side by the river and the
steamers. On the right bank of the Blue Nile was the small North Fort.
Between the two stretched the island of Tuti, and at each end of the
wall, on the White Nile as well as the Blue, Gordon had stationed a
_santal_ or heavy-armed barge, carrying a gun. Unfortunately, a large
part of the western end of the Khartoum wall had been washed away by
an inundation of the Nile, but the mines supplied a substitute, and so
long as Omdurman Fort was held this weakness in the defences of
Khartoum did not greatly signify. That fort itself lay on the left
bank of the White Nile. It was well built and fairly strong, but the
position was faulty. It lay in a hollow, and the trench of the
extensive camp formed for Hicks's force furnished the enemy with
cover. It was also 1200 yards from the river bank, and when the enemy
became more enterprising it was impossible to keep up communication
with it