the present time, and especially when
we contrast its sense of justice and right with the weakness and
inability of some of its public servants, does it not seem to be a
little presumptuous for them to assume that "the danger is from the
multitudes--the majority, with whom is the power," and that, were it not
for their superior wisdom and patriotic action, this great government of
the people, by the people and for the people would be a failure?

Mr. Lincoln never feared "the whim and greed" of "that great majority,"
but he had at all times implicit confidence in the great mass of the
people, and they in return had full confidence that no temptation of
wealth or power was sufficient to seduce his integrity.

We cannot dismiss this subject without referring to a stratagem which
railroads have in the past repeatedly resorted to for the purpose of
removing from the bench judges of independent minds whom they found it
impossible to control. This stratagem consists of a well-disguised
bribe, by which a Federal judge is changed into a railroad attorney with
a princely salary. The railroad thus gets rid of an undesirable judge
and gains a desirable solicitor at a price at which they could well have
afforded to pension the judge.

The following is a copy of a broker's circular letter sent to prominent
bankers of Iowa, and shows that even the Clerk of the United States
Court is not overlooked:

"----, June 30th, 1892.

"Mr. ----,

"We offer, subject to sale at par and interest, note $2,500.
Date, July 5th, 1892. Time, six months; rate, 6 per cent.
Payable where desired. Maker, ---- Endorser, Judge ---- Mr.
----, the maker, is clerk of the United States Circuit Court
at ---- Judge ---- the well known attorney of the ---- and
---- Railway Co., of ----, stated to us to be worth $150,000
to $200,000. Can you use it?"

While railroad managers rely upon servile courts as a last resort to
defeat the will of the sovereign people, they are far from losing sight
of the importance of controlling the legislative branch of the
government. By preventing what they are pleased to call unfriendly
legislation they are more likely to prevent friction with public
opinion, and they avoid at the same time the risk of permanently
prejudicing their cause by an adverse opinion upon a constitutional
question which they may find it necessary to raise in order to nullify a
legislative act. Ther