e are three distinct means employed by them to
control legislative action. First, the election to legislative offices
of men who are, for some personal reason, adherents to the railroad
cause. Second, the delusion, or even corruption, of weak or unscrupulous
members of legislative bodies. Third, the employment of professional and
incidental lobbyists and the subsidizing of newspapers, or their
representatives, for the purpose of influencing members of legislative
bodies and their constituencies.

There are probably in every legislative body a number of members who are
in some way or other connected with railroad corporations. No doubt, a
majority of these are personally irreproachable and even so high-minded
as to always postpone private for public interest; yet there are also
those whose political advancement was brought about by railroad managers
for the very purpose of having in the legislative body servile members
who could always be relied upon to serve their corporate masters.
Nevertheless, were railroad interests restricted to the votes of these
men for their support, the public would probably have no cause for alarm
on account of the presence of railroad representatives in legislative
bodies, but, as many other interests seek favorable legislation,
railroad men are often enabled to gain support for their cause by a
corrupt bargain for votes, and it is thus possible for them to double,
triple, and even quadruple, their original strength, by a policy of
reciprocity.

As in Congress and State legislatures, so these representatives of the
railroads may be found in our city councils. The leaders of the
railroads in Congress and in the legislatures of the various States
usually rely upon discretion for obtaining their end, but railroad
aldermen with but few exceptions seek to demonstrate their loyalty to
the cause to which they are committed by a zealous advocacy of extreme
measures, and will not unfrequently even gain their end through the most
unscrupulous combinations. If their votes, together with such support as
they obtain by making trades, are not sufficient to carry out or defeat
a measure which the railroad interests may favor or oppose, even more
questionable means are employed to gain a sufficient number of votes to
command a majority.

Outright bribery is probably the means least often employed by
corporations to carry their measures. While it may be true that the vote
of every weak and unscrupulous leg