sible. Where
the same commodity is supplied by a large number of individuals, there
is but little danger for the public from those who supply it, for an
agreement among many cannot easily be effected; and even if an
understanding could be reached, it would not long be satisfactory to all
parties. Disagreements would arise which would end in the dissolution of
the combination. Where, however, the number of competitors is small,
agreements can be easily effected and successfully maintained.

It is doubtful whether there is at present any interest in the
commercial world which has a greater tendency to monopoly and
combination than the railroad interest. There are in the United States
some 40,000 railroad stations. Not more than 4,000 of these are
junctions of two or more roads. At 90 per cent. of these stations
shippers are therefore confined to one line of railroad, and are, in
absence of State regulation, compelled to pay for transportation
whatever price the companies may be disposed to charge, subject only to
such restrictions as the proximity of competing points may impose. If
competition obtained at all points where two or more roads meet, many
railroad companies could not afford to charge excessive rates at
non-competitive points along their lines of road, for such a policy
would slowly but surely drive a large volume of their legitimate
business to rival roads, to whose interest it would be to encourage by
every means in their power such diversion of traffic. Railroads early
recognized this fact and took steps to enable each line to control its
local business. The first combinations among railroad companies to
control prices at competitive points were rather crude; in fact, much
cruder than the first Granger legislation. They were simple agreements
among the various roads touching a common point to maintain certain
fixed rates. But while each road was anxious to have the rates agreed
upon maintained by all of its rivals, it cared but little about
maintaining its own good faith, and it improved every opportunity to get
business at reduced rates so long as it could reasonably hope to escape
detection. As soon as any of the competing roads, through the
falling-off of its business, became convinced that it was the victim of
overreaching rivals, it retaliated by offering still lower rates to
close-tongued shippers. This tricky rivalry would be continued until the
animosity engendered by it would lead to an open rupture