oast
south of Newport, in May, were the offensive operations with which the
British initiated the campaign of 1813. These blockades were
supported, and their effects sustained and intensified, by an
accumulation of naval force entirely beyond the competition of the
American navy. In view of such overwhelming disparity, it was no
longer possible, as in 1812, by assembling a squadron, to impose some
measure of concentration upon the enemy, and thus to facilitate
egress and ingress. The movements of the British had passed wholly
beyond control. Their admiral was free to dispose his fleet as he
would, having care only not to hazard a detachment weaker than that in
the port watched. This was a condition perfectly easy of fulfilment
with the numbers under his command. As a matter of fact, his vessels
were distributed over the entire seacoast; and at every point, with
the possible exception of Boston, the division stationed was so strong
that escape was possible only by evasion, under cover of severe
weather conditions.
Under such circumstances, the larger the ship the more difficult for
her to get out. As early as the middle of April, Captain Jones,
formerly of the "Wasp," and now commanding the "Macedonian" in New
York, reports that "both outlets are at present strongly blocked, but
I believe at dark of the moon we shall be able to pass without much
risk."[36] May 22, when a moon had come and gone, Decatur, still on
board the "United States," in company with which the "Macedonian" was
to sail, thinks it will be better to try the Sound route. "The last
gale, which promised the fairest opportunity for us to get out, ended
in light southerly winds, which continued till the blockading ships
had regained their stations."[37] A few days later, the attempt by the
Sound resulted in the two being driven into New London, where they
remained to the close of the war. The only offensive operation by sea
open to the United States, the destruction of the enemy's commerce,
fell therefore to the smaller cruisers and privateers, the size and
numbers of which combined to make it impossible to restrain them all.
For defensive measures the seaboard depended upon such fortifications
as existed, everywhere inadequate, but which either the laxness or the
policy of the British commander did not attempt to overcome in the
case of the seaports, narrowly so called. The wide-mouthed estuaries
of the Chesapeake and Delaware, entrance to which could n
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