ic to
take part in the Cuban war were a true fleet in being, however inferior
and forlorn, and were so regarded by the United States authorities so
long as they remained strategically at large. Even when two of them and
two destroyers were known to be in Santiago, the Secretary of the United
States Navy telegraphed to Admiral Sampson, "Essential to know if all
four Spanish cruisers in Santiago. Military expedition must wait this
information." The same thing happened in the war between Russia and
Japan. The first act of Japan in that war was by a torpedo attack on the
Russian fleet at Port Arthur, so to depress the _animus pugnandi_ of
the latter as practically to deprive it for a time of the character of
a fleet in being--a character which it only partially recovered
afterwards under the brief influence of the heroic but ill-fated
Makaroff. This being accomplished, the invasion of Manchuria ensued as a
matter of course. The ascendency thus established by the Japanese fleet
at the outset, though assailed more than once, was nevertheless
maintained throughout the subsequent operations until the Russian fleet
at Port Arthur, deprived of the little character it ever possessed as a
true fleet in being, was reduced to the condition of what Admiral Mahan
has aptly called a "fortress fleet," and was surrendered at the fall of
the fortress. Many other illustrations of the principle of the fleet in
being might be given. The history of naval warfare is full of them. But
they need not be multiplied as they all point the same moral. That moral
is, that a fleet in being to be of any use must be inspired by a
determined and persistent _animus pugnandi_. It must not be a mere
"fortress fleet." Torrington can never have imagined for a moment that
the fleet which, in spite of the disastrous orders of Mary and her
council, he had saved from destruction, would by its mere existence
prevent a French invasion. He had kept it in being in order that he
might use it offensively whenever occasion should arise, well knowing
that so long as it maintained that disposition Tourville would be
paralysed for offence. "Whilst we observe the French," he said, "they
cannot make any attempt on ships or shore without running a great
hazard." Such hazards may be run for an adequate object, and to
determine rightly when they may be run and when they may not is perhaps
the most searching test of a naval commander's capacity and insight. It
is a psychological qu