le information, and the
directing authority for all the larger strategy of the campaign. Except
in degree, moreover, there is nothing new in this. When Nelson was
returning across the Atlantic, after chasing Villeneuve out of the West
Indies, his only way of informing the Admiralty of the nature of the
situation was to send on Bettesworth in the brig "Curieux" with his
news. Nowadays a modern "Curieux" would be able to send on the news as
soon as she came within fifteen hundred or possibly two thousand miles
from the British Isles, and Nelson at the same distance might have
received his orders direct from the Admiralty. But the special point to
note is that as soon as Bettesworth's information was received at the
Admiralty, Barham, the First Lord of the Admiralty, instantly issued
orders which profoundly modified the dispositions of the fleets engaged
in blockading the French ports and led directly to Calder's action off
Finisterre, and in the sequel to the abandonment by Napoleon of all his
projects of invasion and the destruction of the allied fleets at
Trafalgar. There were giants in those days both afloat and ashore. But
the giants afloat did not resent the interference of the giants ashore,
and, as Mr Corbett has shown, the Trafalgar campaign was conducted with
consummate sagacity by Barham, who embodied in himself the War Staff of
the time.

Such is the transcendent importance of intelligence, and of its
collection, transmission, collation, interpretation, and translation
into supreme executive orders. Its collection and transmission is mainly
the function of cruising ships disposed either individually or in small
groups for the purpose, and at such a distance from the main body of
battleships as is not incompatible with the movements of the latter
being controlled and directed, either by their immediate commanders, or
by the War Staff at the centre, according to the information received
from the outlying cruisers. Such cruising vessels may vary in size and
strength from the modern battle-cruiser, so heavily armed and armoured
as to be not incapable of taking a place, on occasion, in the line of
battle, down to the smallest torpedo craft which is endowed with
sufficient enduring mobility to enable her to keep the sea and to cruise
as near as may be to the enemy's ports. I have already indicated the
other collateral functions which will have to be discharged by torpedo
craft in case of a blockade and pointed out th