ardly any
limit can be assigned to the size of the modern warship on these
particular grounds. Quite the contrary. Other things being equal, the
bigger the ship the higher the speed, and it is well known that ships of
the Dreadnought type are as handy to steer as a torpedo boat. For
tactical reasons, moreover, it is not expedient to lengthen the line of
battle unduly. Hence there is a manifest advantage in concentrating
offensive power, as far as may be, in single units. On the other hand,
the experience and practice of the eighteenth century showed
conclusively that there was also a distinct advantage in having in the
line of battle a certain number of ships which, being smaller than their
consorts, were more handy and faster sailing than the latter. The enemy
might not want to fight. Very often he did not, and by crowding all
possible sail he did his best to get away. In this case the only way to
bring him to action was for the pursuing admiral to order "a general
chase"--that is, to direct his ships, disregarding the precise line of
battle, to hurry on with all possible sail after the enemy so that the
fastest ships of the pursuing fleet might bring individually to action
the laggards of the retreating fleet and hold them until the main body
of the pursuing fleet came up. In this case the retreating admiral must
either return to the succour of his ships astern and thereby accept the
general action which he sought to avoid, or abandon his overtaken ships
to the enemy without attempting to rescue them. Hawke's action in
Quiberon Bay and Duncan's action off Camperdown are two of the most
memorable examples of this particular mode of attack, and their
brilliant results are a striking testimony to its efficacy. If ever in
the naval battles of the future it becomes expedient for an admiral to
order a general chase, it stands to reason that ships of the
battle-cruiser type will be invaluable for the purpose. Their speed will
enable them to hold the tail of the enemy's line, and their power will
enable them to crush it unless the retreating admiral who seeks to avoid
a decisive action turns back to succour such of his ships as are
assailed and thereby renders a decisive action inevitable.

There is, moreover, another function to be assigned to the
battle-cruiser in a general action, and that is a function which was
defined once for all by Nelson himself in the immortal memorandum in
which he explained to his captains the mod