It suffices to say that whatever the measure
may be it must be provided and maintained at all hazards. That is merely
the axiomatic expression of the things that belong to our peace.
It will be observed that the German declaration assumes that "a great
naval Power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all its
forces against" a single adversary. This raises at once the question of
the distribution of naval force, or of what has been called the peace
strategy of position. I shall endeavour to discuss the problem with as
little reference as may be to an actual state of war between any two
individual and specific naval Powers. I shall merely assume that of two
possible belligerents one is so far stronger than the other as to look
with confidence to being able in the event of war to secure and maintain
its own command of the sea; and in order not to complicate the problem
unduly I shall include in the term "belligerent" not merely a single
Power but an alliance of one or more separate Powers, while still
adhering to the assumption that the relative strength of the two
belligerents is as defined above. If England is one of the Powers
affected it is manifest from what has already been said that this
assumption is a legitimate one.
In such a situation it stands to reason that the concentration of the
whole force of the stronger belligerent against the whole force equally
concentrated of the weaker belligerent would not be necessary and would
very rarely be expedient. The stronger belligerent would of course seek,
in time of war, so to dispose his forces as to make it impossible for
the weaker fleets of his adversary to take the sea without being brought
to a decisive action, and he would so order his peace strategy of
position as to further that paramount purpose. But it does not follow
that being superior in the measure above defined he would need to
concentrate all his available forces for that purpose. He would
concentrate so much of his forces as would ensure victory in the
encounters anticipated--so far as mere numbers apart from fighting
efficiency can ensure victory--and the residue would be available for
other and subsidiary purposes. If there were no residue, then the
required superiority would not have been attained, and the belligerent
who has neglected to attain it must take the consequences. One of these
consequences would certainly be that the other and subsidiary purposes
above mentioned would
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