rces of the enemy as to decline a conflict and retire to some place of
safety. On the broad principle that the paramount object of all warfare
is the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy, Tourville, if he
felt himself strong enough, was bound to seek out the allied fleet and
challenge it to a decisive combat. On the same principle, Torrington, if
he felt himself strong enough, was bound to pursue the same aggressive
strategy, and by thoroughly beating the French to frustrate all their
objects at once. But Torrington was not strong enough and knew that he
was not strong enough. He had foreseen the crisis and warned his
superiors betimes, entreating them to take adequate measures for dealing
with it. They took no such measures. On the contrary, the dispositions
they made were calculated rather to aggravate the danger than to avert
it. Early in the year a fleet of sixteen sail of the line under
Killigrew had been sent in charge of a convoy to Cadiz with orders to
prevent, if possible, the exit of the Toulon fleet from the
Mediterranean and to follow it up should it make good its escape. This
strategy was unimpeachable if only Killigrew could make sure of
intercepting Chateau-Renault and defeating him, and if the naval forces
left in home waters when Killigrew was detached were sufficient to give
a good account of the fleet that Tourville was collecting at Brest. But
in its results it was disastrous, for Killigrew, delayed by weather and
by the many preoccupations, commercial and strategic, entailed by his
instructions was unable either to bar the passage of the Toulon fleet or
to overtake it during its progress towards the Channel. Hence
Chateau-Renault was able to effect his junction with Tourville
unmolested, while Killigrew did not reach Plymouth until after the
battle of Beachy Head had been fought, when, Tourville being victorious
in the Channel, he was obliged to carry his squadron into the Hamoaze so
as to be out of harm's way. Shovel, having escorted the king and his
troops to Ireland, was equally unable to carry out his orders to join
Torrington in the Channel, since Tourville stood in the way. Hence,
although fully alive to the strategic value, in certain contingencies,
of the forces under Killigrew and Shovel, Torrington was compelled to
rely mainly on the force under his immediate command, the insufficiency
of which he had many months before pointed out and vainly implored his
superiors to redress.
The
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