istings, that without
the interval caused by Germany's efforts in Vienna, which interval
England allowed to pass unused in Petersburg, the war would have broken
out a few days sooner.

Let us consider how the fact of the Russian mobilization, the dimensions
and tendency of which was brought to the knowledge of the London Cabinet
at the very latest on July 24, must affect Germany.

On July 24 the Russian Government declared, in an official communique,
it would be impossible for it to remain indifferent in an Austro-Servian
conflict.

Germany's Hand Forced.

This declaration was followed immediately by military measures which
represented the beginning of Russian mobilization long planned. But even
on July 27 the Russian Minister of War, Suchomlinof, assured
the German Military Attache upon word of honor (Annex 11 of the German
"White Paper") that no order for mobilization had been given and no
reservists had been drawn and no horse had been commandeered.

Although in this conversation there had been left no doubt to the
Russian Minister of War concerning the fact that measures of
mobilization against Austria must be considered by Germany also as very
threatening toward itself, during the next days news of the Russian
mobilization arrived in quick succession.

On the 29th mobilization of Southern and Southwestern Russia was
ordered, which was extended on the 30th to twenty-three provinces.

On the night of the 30th to the 31st, while the efforts of the Kaiser to
maintain peace were continuing and were receiving friendly attention in
Vienna, in St. Petersburg the mobilization of the entire Russian Army
was ordered. Even as late as 2 P.M. on the 31st, however, (German "White
Paper," Page 18, of NEW YORK TIMES reprint,) the Czar telegraphed the
Kaiser that the military measures now being taken were meant for
defensive purposes against Austria's preparations, and he gave his
pledge as far away from desiring war.

In the face of such evident duplicity of Russian politics, a further
delay such as was desired by Sir Maurice de Bunsen would have been for
every German statesman a crime against the security of his own country.

On the other hand, upon what German measures did the Russian Government
base its order for mobilization? The British "White Paper" proves how
frivolously steps leading to the most serious results were ordered in
St. Petersburg. On July 30 Sir George Buchanan telegraphed:

M. Sazonof told us t