ussia, when its own
mobilization was concerned, showed toward Germany. Did Sir Edward not
notice this duplicity, or did he not wish to notice it? If the documents
of the English Government have not been selected with the purpose to
confuse, then in London the decision to take part in the war does not
seem to have been a certainty at the beginning. We have seen that
Ambassador Buchanan in St. Petersburg on July 24 gave the Russian
Minister to understand that England was not of a mind to go to war on
account of Servia. This position, taken by the Ambassador, was approved
by Sir Edward Grey on the following day in the following words:

I entirely approve what you said ... and I cannot promise more on
behalf of the Government.--(British "White Paper" No. 24.)

Based upon these instructions, Sir George Buchanan, even on July 27,
stated to M. Sazonof, who continued to urge England to unconditionally
join Russia and France:

I added that you [Grey] could not promise to do anything more, and
that his Excellency was mistaken if he believed that the cause of
peace could be promoted by our telling the German Government that
they would have to deal with us as well as with Russia and France
if she supported Austria by force of arms. Their [the German]
attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace.--(British
"White Paper" No. 44.)

But on this same 27th day of July, Grey, submitting to the intrigues of
Russian and French diplomacy, had committed one very fateful step
(Telegram to Buchanan, July 27):

I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and
Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would
stand aside. His Excellency deplored the effect that such an
impression must produce. This impression ought, as I have pointed
out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the first fleet
which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland not to disperse
for manoeuvre leave. But I explained to the Russian Ambassador that
my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more
than diplomatic action was promised.--(British "White Paper" No.
47.)

For Russia this order to the fleet meant very much more than a
diplomatic action. Sazonof saw that the wind in London was turning in
his favor and he made use of it. Among themselves the Russian
diplomatists seem to have for a long time been clear and o