the French Ambassador in London, reported by Grey, prove that, on the
ground of this agreement, France, with very little trouble, would be
able to make out of a diplomatic entanglement a case for Allies'
interest as far as England is concerned.

A German "Attack."

He [Cambon] anticipated that the [German] aggression would take the form
of either a demand to cease her preparations or a demand that she should
engage to remain neutral if there was war between Germany and Russia.
Neither of these things would France admit.--(British "White Paper" No.
105.)

Therefore, even the demand addressed to France not to, jointly with
Russia, attack Germany became a German "attack," which obliged England
to come to the aid!

In spite of this, even on July 27 in a conversation with Cambon, Grey
gave himself the appearance as if his hands were free. He told the
Frenchman:

If Germany became involved and France became involved we had not
made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should
have to consider.... We were free from engagements and we should
have to decide what British interests required us to do.--(British
"White Paper" No. 87.)

M. Cambon remarked in reply that the Secretary of State had clearly
pictured the situation, but on the very following day the French
Ambassador took the liberty to remind Grey of the letter written in
1912. (British "White Paper" No. 105.)

Grey did not deny the claim implied in this reminder, but even as late
as July 31 he reports as follows concerning the conversation with
Cambon:

Up to the present moment we did not feel and public opinion
did not feel that any treaties or obligations of this country were
involved.... M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help
France if Germany made an attack on her. I said I could only adhere
to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could
not take any engagement.... I said that the Cabinet would certainly
be summoned as soon as there was some new development; that at the
present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not
undertake any definite engagement.--(British "White Paper" No.
119.)

Now, if we remember that even on the day before Grey had informed the
German Imperial Chancellor that it would be a shame for England to
remain neutral and allow France to be crushed, we here find a new proof
of the unreliability o