FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   44   45   46   47   48   49   50   51   52   53   54   55   56   57   58   59   60   61   62   63   64   65   66   67   68  
69   70   71   72   73   74   75   76   77   78   79   80   81   82   83   84   85   86   87   88   89   90   91   92   93   >>   >|  
ght to nine days had to elapse before the beginning of the war. Let us see whether Sir Edward Grey used this time to preserve peace, according to his own documents. From this testimony it appears that even at the beginning of the last and decisive part of the European crisis, which began on June 28, 1914, with the assassination of the Austrian heir to the throne, Sir Edward Grey refrained from considering a direct participation of his country in the possible world war. At least, this must be the impression gained from his remarks to the representatives of the two powers with whom England is today at war. Thus, he said to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Mensdorff, on July 23: The possible consequences of the present situation were terrible. If as many as four great powers of Europe--let us say Austria, France, Russia, and Germany--were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money and such an interference with trade that a war would be accompanied or followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry.--(British "White Paper" No. 3.) Here Grey speaks only of four of the big powers at most that may go to war, without even hinting at the fifth, namely, England. On July 24 he had another conversation with the Austrian Ambassador, the theme of which was the note--meanwhile presented to Servia. It caused apprehensions on his part, but he declared again: The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of his Majesty's Government.... I [Grey] ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.--(British "White Paper" No. 5.) We are already striking the fateful peculiarity of Grey's policy to hesitate where prompt action, or at least a clear and open conduct, would have been his duty. This weakness of his nature has been used with great art by French and Russian diplomacy. This is illustrated by the conversation of July 24 between him and the French Ambassador, Cambon, in London: M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four powers he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russi
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   44   45   46   47   48   49   50   51   52   53   54   55   56   57   58   59   60   61   62   63   64   65   66   67   68  
69   70   71   72   73   74   75   76   77   78   79   80   81   82   83   84   85   86   87   88   89   90   91   92   93   >>   >|  



Top keywords:

powers

 

Ambassador

 

situation

 
England
 

Austria

 

Government

 

Cambon

 

French

 

British

 
conversation

Servia

 

Edward

 

Austrian

 
beginning
 

European

 

exchange

 

difficulties

 

mitigate

 

apprehensions

 

declared


caused

 

presented

 
merits
 

dispute

 

striking

 

doubtless

 

concern

 
Majesty
 

hesitate

 
chance

mediation
 

London

 
Petersburg
 

pointed

 
illustrated
 

diplomacy

 

action

 

conduct

 

prompt

 

peculiarity


policy

 

elapse

 

Russian

 

nature

 

weakness

 

fateful

 

present

 

terrible

 
consequences
 

Mensdorff