hide that distinction? You would not pray him to
compassionate the poor Frenchman, or the unhappy German. Far from it;
you would speak of him as a _foreigner_; an accident to which all are
liable. You would represent him as a _man_; one partaking with us of the
same common nature, and subject to the same law. There is something so
averse from our nature in these artificial political distinctions, that
we need no other trumpet to kindle us to war and destruction. But there
is something so benign and healing in the general voice of humanity
that, maugre all our regulations to prevent it, the simple name of man
applied properly, never fails to work a salutary effect.

This natural unpremeditated effect of policy on the unpossessed passions
of mankind appears on other occasions. The very name of a politician, a
statesman, is sure to cause terror and hatred; it has always connected
with it the ideas of treachery, cruelty, fraud, and tyranny; and those
writers who have faithfully unveiled the mysteries of state-freemasonry,
have ever been held in general detestation, for even knowing so
perfectly a theory so detestable. The case of Machiavel seems at first
sight something hard in that respect. He is obliged to bear the
iniquities of those whose maxims and rules of government he published.
His speculation is more abhorred than their practice.

But if there were no other arguments against artificial society than
this I am going to mention, methinks it ought to fall by this one only.
All writers on the science of policy are agreed, and they agree with
experience, that, all governments must frequently infringe the rules of
justice to support themselves; that truth must give way to
dissimulation; honesty to convenience; and humanity itself to the
reigning interest. The whole of this mystery of iniquity is called the
reason of state. It is a reason which I own I cannot penetrate. What
sort of a protection is this of the general right, that is maintained by
infringing the rights of particulars? What sort of justice is this,
which is enforced by breaches of its own laws? These paradoxes I leave
to be solved by the able heads of legislators and politicians. For my
part, I say what a plain man would say on such an occasion. I can never
believe that any institution, agreeable to nature, and proper for
mankind, could find it necessary, or even expedient, in any case
whatsoever, to do what the best and worthiest instincts of mankind warn