and
distinction, that their minds, which had been used continually to the
storms of these violent and tempestuous passions, can hardly be put in
motion by the delicate and refined play of the imagination. These men,
though from a different cause, become as stupid and insensible as the
former; but whenever either of these happen to be struck with any
natural elegance or greatness, or with these qualities in any work of
art, they are moved upon the same principle.
The cause of a wrong taste is a defect of judgment. And this may arise
from a natural weakness of understanding (in whatever the strength of
that faculty may consist), or, which is much more commonly the case, it
may arise from a want of a proper and well-directed exercise, which
alone can make it strong and ready. Besides, that ignorance,
inattention, prejudice, rashness, levity, obstinacy, in short, all those
passions, and all those vices, which pervert the judgment in other
matters, prejudice it no less in this its more refined and elegant
province. These causes produce different opinions upon everything which
is an object of the understanding, without inducing us to suppose that
there are no settled principles of reason. And indeed, on the whole, one
may observe, that there is rather less difference upon matters of taste
among mankind, than upon most of those which depend upon the naked
reason; and that men are far better agreed on the excellence of a
description in Virgil, than on the truth or falsehood of a theory of
Aristotle.
A rectitude of judgment in the arts, which may be called a good taste,
does in a great measure depend upon sensibility; because if the mind has
no bent to the pleasures of the imagination, it will never apply itself
sufficiently to works of that species to acquire a competent knowledge
in them. But though a degree of sensibility is requisite to form a good
judgment, yet a good judgment does not necessarily arise from a quick
sensibility of pleasure; it frequently happens that a very poor judge,
merely by force of a greater complexional sensibility, is more affected
by a very poor piece, than the best judge by the most perfect; for as
everything now, extraordinary, grand, or passionate, is well calculated
to affect such a person, and that the faults do not affect him, his
pleasure is more pure and unmixed; and as it is merely a pleasure of the
imagination, it is much higher than any which is derived from a
rectitude of the judgm
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