he excellences or the defects of a
composition. So far as the imagination, and the passions are concerned,
I believe it true, that the reason is little consulted; but where
disposition, where decorum, where congruity are concerned, in short,
wherever the best taste differs from the worst, I am convinced that the
understanding operates, and nothing else; and its operation is in
reality far from being always sudden, or, when it is sudden, it is often
far from being right. Men of the best taste by consideration come
frequently to change these early and precipitate judgments, which the
mind, from its aversion to neutrality and doubt, loves to form on the
spot. It is known that the taste (whatever it is) is improved exactly
as we improve our judgment, by extending our knowledge, by a steady
attention to our object, and by frequent exercise. They who have not
taken these methods, if their taste decides quickly, it is always
uncertainly; and their quickness is owing to their presumption and
rashness, and not to any sudden irradiation, that in a moment dispels
all darkness from their minds. But they who have cultivated that species
of knowledge which makes the object of taste, by degrees and habitually
attain not only a soundness but a readiness of judgment, as men do by
the same methods on all other occasions. At first they are obliged to
spell, but at last they read with ease and with celerity; but this
celerity of its operation is no proof that the taste is a distinct
faculty. Nobody, I believe, has attended the course of a discussion
which turned upon matters within the sphere of mere naked reason, but
must have observed the extreme readiness with which the whole process of
the argument is carried on, the grounds discovered, the objections
raised and answered, and the conclusions drawn from premises, with a
quickness altogether as great as the taste can be supposed to work with;
and yet where nothing but plain reason either is or can be suspected to
operate. To multiply principles for every different appearance is
useless, and unphilosophical too in a high degree.

This matter might be pursued much farther; but it is not the extent of
the subject which must prescribe our bounds, for what subject does not
branch out to infinity? It is the nature of our particular scheme, and
the single point of view in which we consider it, which ought to put a
stop to our researches.

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