and in their reasonings about them. Many are of
opinion, that pain arises necessarily from the removal of some pleasure;
as they think pleasure does from the ceasing or diminution of some pain.
For my part, I am rather inclined to imagine, that pain and pleasure,
in their most simple and natural manner of affecting, are each of a
positive nature, and by no means necessarily dependent on each other for
their existence. The human mind is often, and I think it is for the most
part, in a state neither of pain nor pleasure, which I call a state of
indifference. When I am carried from this state into a state of actual
pleasure, it does not appear necessary that I should pass through the
medium of any sort of pain. If in such a state of indifference, or ease,
or tranquillity, or call it what you please, you were to be suddenly
entertained with a concert of music; or suppose some object of a fine
shape, and bright, lively colors, to be presented before you; or imagine
your smell is gratified with the fragrance of a rose; or if, without any
previous thirst, you were to drink of some pleasant kind of wine, or to
taste of some sweetmeat without being hungry; in all the several senses,
of hearing, smelling, and tasting, you undoubtedly find a pleasure; yet,
if I inquire into the state of your mind previous to these
gratifications, you will hardly tell me that they found you in any kind
of pain; or, having satisfied these several senses with their several
pleasures, will you say that any pain has succeeded, though the pleasure
is absolutely over? Suppose, on the other hand, a man in the same state
of indifference to receive a violent blow, or to drink of some bitter
potion, or to have his ears wounded with some harsh and grating sound;
here is no removal of pleasure; and yet here is felt, his every sense
which is affected, a pain very distinguishable. It may be said, perhaps,
that the pain in these cases had its rise from the removal of the
pleasure which the man enjoyed before, though that pleasure was of so
low a degree as to be perceived only by the removal. But this seems to
me a subtilty that is not discoverable in nature. For if, previous to
the pain, I do not feel any actual pleasure, I have no reason to judge
that any such thing exists; since pleasure is only pleasure as it is
felt. The same may be said of pain, and with equal reason. I can never
persuade myself that pleasure and pain are mere relations, which can
only exist