m the British army and the Fifth French Army; he might
have been caught as in a vise between these forces while all his
activity was being absorbed by his attack on the intrenchments around
Paris.

It has been said that if Von Kluck had won the French capital, as it
seemed he might, the French could not have gained the Battle of the
Marne, and the result of the war might have been very different. It was,
however, no mistake on the part of Von Kluck, no false maneuver on his
part, that determined the victory of the Marne. Von Kluck did exactly
what he ought to have done; the decision taken by the German General
Staff was exactly what it ought to have taken, and what was foreseen
during the whole course of the war.

It was on September 4, 1914, in the morning, that the observations made
by the French cavalry, as well as by British aviators and those of the
army of Manoury and the military government of Paris, made it clear that
the German right (Von Kluck's army) was bending its march toward the
southeast in the direction of Meaux and Coulommiers, leaving behind it
the road to Paris.

At this moment the Fifth French Army of the left was ready to meet the
German forces in a frontal attack, and it was flanked toward the
northwest by the British army and by General Manoury's army to the
northeast of the capital.

The disposition of forces aimed at in General Joffre's order of August
25 was thus accomplished; the French escaped the turning movement, and
they were in a position to counter with an enveloping movement
themselves. The wings of the French forces found support in their
maneuvering in their contact with the strongholds of Paris and Verdun.
Immediately the commander in chief decided to attack, and issued on the
evening of September 4 the series of general orders, which announced the
big offensive and eventually turned the tide of battle.

CHAPTER XV

GERMAN RETREAT

That morning of the 8th, then, saw General von Kluck in full retreat.
His frontal attack on General d'Esperey had failed and the Fifth French
Army had advanced. The British were at his flank, and besides, they had
been able to spare some of their heavy artillery to send to the Sixth
Army under General Maunoury, to enable him to cross the Ourcq. It is by
no means certain that even with this assistance could the Sixth Army
have silenced the terrible fire of those howitzers, but General von
Kluck dared no longer leave his artillery there, it