h anticipated, for the
same rainy conditions that provided a pitfall for the Germans were also
a manifest hindrance to the rapid execution of military maneuvers. But,
in spite of all difficulties, by evening of that day, the flank broke
and gave way, and two entire corps from General von Buelow's right were
precipitated into the marshes. Forty guns were taken--to that time the
largest capture of artillery made by the Allies--and a number of
prisoners. Hundreds perished miserably, but General Foch held back his
artillery from an indiscriminate slaughter of men made helpless in the
slimy mud. Thus ended the "Affair of the Marshes of St. Gond," which
broke still further the German right wing.

Thanks to General Foch's further activities, General von Buelow had
troubles upon his left wing. When dawn of this same day of torrential
rain, September 9, 1914, broke over the hill-road that runs from Mareuil
to Fere-Champenoise, at which point lay the left of General von Buelow's
army, it witnessed a number of 75-millimeter guns on selected gun sites
commanding the right flank of the German right center. General Foch's
daring, the success of the maneuver, and the fact that the conduct of
all the French armies on that day and the day following seems to be with
the full cognizance of this venture, led inevitably to the conclusion
that those brilliant feats, conceived by General Foch, had been
communicated to General Joffre in time for the French General Staff to
direct the French armies to the right and left of General Foch to
cooperate with his action. Had General Foch been less ably supported,
his wedge might have proved a weak salient open to attack on both sides.
But General Foch's main army to the west kept General von Buelow busy,
and General Langle's army to the east fought too stubbornly for the Duke
of Wuerttemberg to dare detach any forces for the relief of General von
Buelow. General von Hausen's Saxon Army was weak, at best.

What were the forces that operated to make this particular point so weak
are not generally known. As, however, the divisions from Alsace were
much in evidence three or four days later, it is more than probable that
these divisions were intended for service at this point, and also to
reenforce General von Kluck's army, but that, by the quick offensive
assumed by General Joffre on the Ourcq, and, owing to the roundabout
nature of the German means of communication, these expected
reenforcements had no