or their artillery. As the German drive advanced, a huge
body of sappers and miners had been left behind to fortify this Aisne
line, and the system developed was much the same along its entire
distance.

There were two lines of barbed-wire entanglements, one in the bed of the
stream which would prevent fording or swimming, and which, being under
water, could not easily be destroyed by gunfire from the southern bank.
Above this was a heavy chevaux-de-frise and barbed-wire entanglement,
partly sunk and concealed from view; in many places pitted and covered
with brushwood. Above this, following approximately a thirty-foot
contour, came a line of trenches for infantry, and fifty yards behind a
second line of trenches, commanding a further elevation of fifty feet.
Two-thirds of the way up the hill came the trench-living quarters, the
kitchens, the bakeries, the dormitories, and so forth, and the crest of
the hill bristled along its entire length with field guns, effectually
screened by trees. On the further side of the ridge, in chalk pits, were
the great howitzers, tossing their huge shells over the ridge and its
defenses into the river itself, and even on the south bank beyond.
Truly, a position of power, and one that the boldest of troops might
hesitate to attack.

It is quite possible that had the entire strength of the German position
been known, no attempt to cross would have been made, but there was
always a possibility that the counterchecks of the German army were no
more than the rear-guard actions of the three or four days immediately
preceding. Yet Sir John French seems to have expected the true state of
affairs, for he remarks in his dispatches:

"The battles of the Marne, which lasted from the morning of the 6th to
the evening of the 10th, had hardly ended in the precipitate flight of
the enemy when we were brought face to face with a position of
extraordinary strength, carefully intrenched and prepared for defense by
an army and staff which are thorough adepts in such work."

Yet it was evident that if the armies of the Allies were to secure any
lasting benefit from the battles of the Marne, they must dislodge the
invading hosts from their new vantage ground. It was obvious that the
task was one of great peril and one necessarily likely to be attended
with heavy loss of life. Sir John French, knowing the tactical value of
driving a fleeing army hard, determined on forcing the issue without
delay.

Before