time General von Kluck,
commanding the German right, could execute a swift movement to the
southeast, the Fifth French Army would be between two fires, together
with such part of the Ninth Army as lay to the westward of the point to
be pierced. This strategic plan held high promise, and it would have
menaced the whole interior of France southward from the plain of
Champagne, but even this second part of the plan, important as it was,
does not appear to have been the crucial point in the campaign.

The glory of the victory, if indeed victory it should prove, as the
successes of the previous two weeks had led the Germans to believe, was
to be given to the crown prince. With a great deal of trouble and with
far more delay than had been anticipated, the crown prince's army had at
last managed to get within striking distance of the forefront of the
great battle line. His forces occupied the territory north of Verdun to
a southern point not far from Bar-le-Duc. Here the German secret service
seems to have been as efficient, as it failed to be with regard to
conditions only fifty miles away. General Sarrail's army, which
confronted the army of the crown prince, was somewhat weak. It consisted
of about two army corps with reserve divisions. Nor could General Joffre
send any reenforcements. Every available source of reenforcements had
been drawn upon to aid the Sixth Army, encamped upon the banks of the
Ourcq, in order that Paris might be well guarded. No troops could be
spared from the Fifth and Ninth Armies, which had to bear the brunt of
the attack from the German center. General Sarrail, therefore, had to
depend on the natural difficulties of the country and to avoid giving
battle too readily against the superior forces by which he was
confronted. It was a part of the plan of the French generalissimo,
however, to feel the strength of the German center, and if it proved
that they could be held, to release several divisions and send them to
the aid of General Sarrail.

Subordinate to this contemplated attack by the crown prince, yet forming
a part of it, and, in a measure, a fourth element in the campaign, was
the double effort from the garrisons of Metz and Saarbruecken, combining
with the armies of the Bavarian Crown Prince and the forces of General
von Heeringen. The Second French Army, therefore, could not come to the
aid of the Third, except in desperate need, for it was in the very
forefront of the attack on Nancy. If