e three armies in the
field, those commanded severally by General Manoury, Sir John French,
and General Lanrezac, the generalissimo steadily sent reenforcements.
But he informed the French Government that he was not able to save the
capital from a siege. Yet, as after events showed, while these various
conditions could not rightly be considered as ruses upon General
Joffre's part to lure on the Germans, there is no doubt that he
understood and took full advantage of the readiness of the attacking
hosts to esteem all these points as prophetic of future victory. The
first feature of the French plan, therefore, was to lend color to the
German belief that the armies of the Allies were disheartened and
thereby to induce the attacking forces to join the issue quickly.

The second part of the French plan lay in General Joffre's decision not
to do the expected thing. With General Sarrail placed at the extremest
point of danger, it would have been a likely move to transfer the entire
British Expeditionary Force from the left wing to the weak point at
Bar-le-Duc. There is reason to believe that General von Kluck believed
that this had been done.

The third part of the defensive prepared by General Joffre was that of a
determination to turn the steady retreat into a counterdrive. Time after
time had the other generals implored their leader to give them leave to
take the offensive, and on every occasion a shake of the head had been
the reply. Sir John French had wondered. But when the French officers
found themselves in the region of the Marne, close to the marshes of St.
Gond, where in 1814 Napoleon had faced the Russians, they were more
content. It was familiar as well as historic ground. Even the youngest
officer knew every foot of that ground thoroughly. It was, at the same
time, the best point for the forward leap and one of the last points at
which a halt could be made.

The fourth part of the plan was the holding fast to the point of Verdun,
for thereby the communication of the armies of the Central Powers was
seriously weakened. It is to be remembered that this actual fighting
army of more than a million men depended for food and for ammunition
supplies upon the routes from Belgium and Luxemburg by way of Mezieres
and Montmedy, and the circuitous line to Brussels via St. Quentin. Had
Maubeuge fallen a little earlier the situation of the Central Powers
would have been less difficult, and both commissariat and ammunition
p