er of Namur, in
believing the Namur forts would give a better account. The French
General Staff were informed of the approximate strength of the advancing
armies of Von Kluck and Von Buelow, and had nothing to fear from
inferiority in numbers. The staff never gave out the strength of their
forces, but there is reason for believing the great armies were nearly
equally matched after mobilization--about 1,200,000 men.

Let us now see what was developing in the Ardennes away to the French
right. It has been established that woods, particularly in summer, form
the best cover from the observation or attacks of airmen. The spreading,
leafy boughs are difficult to penetrate visually from a height of even a
few hundred feet, at least to obtain accurate information of what is
transpiring beneath.

French air scouts brought in correct information that they had seen the
armies of the Duke of Wuerttemberg and crown prince massed along the
southern Luxemburg and Belgian forest region. But under the foliage
there was another army unseen--that of General von Hausen. The French
moved their Fifth Army up to position on the line of the Sambre. They
advanced their Third Army, commanded by General Ruffey, upon Luxemburg,
and their Fourth Army under General de Langle de Cary across the River
Semois to watch the Meuse left bank and gain touch with General
Lanzerac. General de Cary came from Sedan, throwing out detachments
upon the Meuse left bank. These operations were to confront the armies
of the Duke of Wuerttemberg and crown prince.

But the French apparently knew nothing of the movements of the army of
General von Hausen. Their air scouts either could not distinguish it
from the armies of the Duke of Wuerttemberg and the crown prince, amid
the forest of the Ardennes, or they did not observe it at all. To the
army of General von Hausen there clings a good deal of mystery. When
last noted by us, previous to the minor battle of Dinant, it had been
formed by forces drawn from the armies of the Duke of Wuerttemberg and
crown prince. Ostensibly at that time, it was destined to support, as a
separate field force, the armies of Von Kluck and Von Buelow.

Possibly the Germans had begun to doubt how long Liege could hold out.
Von Kluck was compelled to mark time in his impetuous march on Central
Belgium. His losses had been heavy. Support in strength seemed urgent.
But this need passed as the Liege forts fell one after the other under
the fire