fantry until the morning of
the 2nd. Just as I was leaving camp, I became aware that firing was
going on in the direction of the Shutargardan, and later in the day I
received a report from Colonel Money as to what had happened there.
The enemy, emboldened by the diminished numbers of the garrison, and
undervaluing what might be accomplished by a small number of good
soldiers, had assembled in force, and occupied the crest of the
mountain, the only place from which heliographic communication with me
could be kept up. Money very properly decided that this could not be
permitted, and considered it best to take the initiative before the
enemy should become still stronger, so ordered an advance. Under cover
of the Mountain battery's fire, Major Griffiths, of the 3rd Sikhs,
with 200 of his own men and 50 of the 21st Punjab Infantry, supported
by 150 rifles of the latter corps, stormed the Afghans' position.
The assault, delivered in a most spirited manner, was perfectly
successful.
Major Griffiths, however, was wounded, also a signalling sergeant of
the 67th Foot and five men of the 3rd Sikhs, while the enemy left
thirty dead on the ground, and were pursued down the slope of the hill
without making any attempt to rally.
On the 3rd we marched fifteen miles to Zahidabad, where we first came
in sight of the fortified hill above Kabul. The rear guard was fired
into on the way, and we had considerable difficulty in crossing
the Logar river, as the water from a large irrigation cut had been
directed back into the stream just above the ford. Our only casualty
on this day was Captain 'Dick' Kennedy, who was wounded in the hand.
It was plain from these occurrences, and from the attack on the
Shutargardan, that the people generally were not disposed to be
friendly. From the Amir I could extract no information on this head,
although he must have been fully aware of the feelings and intentions
of his subjects. He was in constant communication with Kabul, and was
frequently being met by mounted messengers, who, from the haste with
which they travelled, as evidenced by the exhausted state of their
horses and the eagerness with which the Amir read the letters they
brought, appeared to be the bearers of important tidings.
It may be imagined how irritating and embarrassing was Yakub Khan's
presence, since his position in my camp enabled him to give the
leaders at Kabul accurate information as to our numbers and movements.
That he f
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