ess deflected
from its course by some other force, it must be equally true that _all_
forces will work out a given consequence unless they are deflected from
their course by the operation of some superior force.
Now if it were possible for the theist to show that in certain cases the
normal consequences of known forces did not transpire, and that the
aberration could not be accounted for by the operation of any other
conceivable force, it might be argued with some degree of plausibility
that there exists a controlling power beyond which answers to God. That
might afford a plausible case for "directivity." But to insist upon the
prevalence of "natural order" will not help the case for theism. It will
rather embarrass it. It may, of course, impress all those whose
conception of scientific method is poor--and sometimes one thinks that
this is all that is deliberately aimed at--but it will not affect anyone
else. To the informed mind it will appear that the Goddite is weakening
his case with every step he takes in the direction of what he apparently
believes to be a demonstration of its logical invulnerability.
CHAPTER V.
THE ARGUMENT FROM CAUSATION.
The argument from causation may logically follow that from existence, of
which it may be regarded as a part. It is presented under various forms,
and when stated in a persuasive manner, is next to the argument from
design, probably as popular as any. The principal reason for this is, I
think, that very few people are concerned with thinking out exactly what
is meant by causation, and the proposition that every event must have a
cause, wins a ready assent, and when followed by the assertion that
therefore the universe must have had a cause, which is God, the
reasoning, or rather the parody of reasoning, appeals to many. There is
a show of reason and logic, but little more.
Quite unquestionably a great deals depends upon what is meant by
causation, and still more upon the use made of the law of causation by
theists. Thus we have seen it urged against Materialists that neural
activity cannot be the equivalent of thought because they do not
resemble each other. And in another direction we meet with the same idea
in the assertion that the cause must be equal to the effect, by which it
is apparently meant that the cause must be _similar_ to the effect, and
that unless we can discern in the cause the same qualities manifested by
the effect, we have not established th
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