ver all his creatures," and although this care
may be subservient to some wide and far-seeing plan, there must be
nothing that looks like obvious carelessness or criminal neglect.

To what conclusion do the facts point when they are examined in the
light of modern knowledge? Does the world supply us with the kind of
picture that one would expect to see if it were really presided over by
divine love under the guidance of divine wisdom, and backed by divine
power? The proof that it does not is shown in the almost endless
attempts made to harmonise the world as it is with the world as theory
would have it be. And a theory that needs so much defending, explaining,
and qualifying must have something radically weak about it. That there
is evil in the world all admit, that it offers _prima facie_ objection
to the theistic hypothesis is confessed by the many attempts made to fit
in this evil with the existence of God, to prove that it works in some
mysterious way for some larger good, or that its presence cannot be
dispensed with profitably. The question of why the world is as it is
with a god such as we are told exists, is, as Canon Green says, "the
really vital question, for it touches the very heart of religion." ("The
Problem of Evil"; p. 46.) How, then, does the Theist deal with it?

Broadly, two methods are adopted. In the one case we are presented with
the order of the world, or the course of evolution, as indicative of a
beneficent scheme. This claims to freely adopt all that science has to
say concerning the development of life and to prove that this is in
harmony with the legitimate demands of the moral sense. The second is
the more orthodox way, and taking the world as it is, claims that pain
and suffering play a disciplinary and educational part in the life of
the individual. We will take these in the order named.

When dealing with the argument from design little was said concerning
the evolutionary explanation of the special adaptations that meet us in
the animal world. It was thought better to fix attention on the purely
logical value of the argument presented. It is now necessary to look a
little closer at the ethical implications of the evolutionary process.

It has been pointed out that all life involves a special degree of
adaptation between an organism and its environment. Destroy that
adjustment and life ceases to exist. How is that adjustment secured? The
answer of the pre-Darwinian was that it represent