e essence, but only a
habit or mode of the faculty.

We have, in the two preceding chapters, arrived at definite conclusions
respecting the power and essence of the imaginative faculty. In these
two acts of penetration and combination, its separating and
characteristic attributes are entirely developed; it remains for us only
to observe a certain habit or mode of operation in which it frequently
delights, and by which it addresses itself to our perceptions more
forcibly, and asserts its presence more distinctly than in those mighty
but more secret workings wherein its life consists.

In our examination of the combining imagination, we chose to assume the
first or simple conception to be as clear in the absence as in the
presence of the object of it. This, I suppose, is in point of fact never
the case, nor is an approximation to such distinctness of conception
always a characteristic of the imaginative mind. Many persons have
thorough and felicitous power of drawing from memory, yet never
originate a thought, nor excite an emotion.

Sec. 2. The ambiguity of conception.

Sec. 3. Is not in itself capable of adding to the charm of fair things.

The form in which conception actually occurs to ordinary minds appears
to derive value and preciousness from that indefiniteness which we
alluded to in the second chapter, (Sec. 2,) for there is an unfailing charm
in the memory and anticipation of things beautiful, more sunny and
spiritual than attaches to their presence; for with their presence it
is possible to be sated, and even wearied, but with the imagination of
them never; in so far that it needs some self-discipline to prevent the
mind from falling into a morbid condition of dissatisfaction with all
that it immediately possesses, and continual longing for things absent;
and yet I think this charm is not justly to be attributed to the mere
vagueness and uncertainty of the conception, except thus far, that of
objects whose substantial presence was ugly or painful the sublimity and
impressiveness, if there were any, is retained in the conception, while
the sensual offensiveness is withdrawn; thus circumstances of horror may
be safely touched in verbal description, and for a time dwelt upon by
the mind, as often by Homer and Spenser, (by the latter frequently with
too much grossness, as in the description of the combat of the Red-Cross
Knight with Errour,) which could not for a moment be regarded or
tolerated in the