ghest importance to strengthen their old
engagements, upon the footing proposed by the late count de Harrach, in
the year one thousand seven hundred and forty-five; a step which might
be taken on occasion of his Polish majesty's accession to the treaty of
Petersburgh. The answer of count Bruhl to this despatch imported, that
the king of Poland was not averse to treat in the utmost secrecy
with the court of Vienna about succours, by private and confidential
declarations relating to the fourth secret article of the treaty of
Petersburgh, on condition of reasonable terms and advantages, which in
this case ought to be granted to his majesty. He quoted other despatches
to prove the unwillingness of his Polish majesty to declare himself
until the king of Prussia should be attacked, and his forces divided;
and that this scruple was admitted by the allies of Saxony. From these
premises he deduced this inference, that the court of Dresden, without
having acceded in form to the treaty of Petersburgh, was not less
an accomplice in the dangerous designs which the court of Vienna had
grounded upon this treaty; and that having been dispensed with from a
formal concurrence, it had only waited for that moment when it might,
without running any great risk, conquer in effect, and share the spoils
of its neighbour. In expectation of this period, he said, the Austrian
and Saxon ministers laboured in concert and underhand with the more
ardour to bring the _casus faederus_ into existence; for it being laid
down as a principle in the treaty, that any war whatever between him
and Russia would authorise the empress-queen to take Silesia, there was
nothing more to be done but to kindle such a war; for which purpose no
method was found more proper than that of embroiling the king with the
empress of Russia; and to provoke that princess with all sorts of false
insinuations, impostures, and the most atrocious calumnies, in laying to
his majesty's charge a variety of designs, sometimes against Russia,
and even the person of the czarina; sometimes views upon Poland, and
sometimes intrigues in Sweden. By these and other such contrivances, he
affirmed they had kindled the animosity of the empress to such a degree,
that in a council held in the month of October, in the year one thousand
seven hundred and fifty-three, she had resolved to attack the king of
Prussia, without any further discussion, whether he should fall upon
any of the allies of Russia, or