throughout its entire range.
The principal inductions drawn from the data collected in the first of
these volumes may be set forth in a few sentences. Multitudinous proofs
are brought forward of the fact that the ethical sentiment prevailing in
different societies, and in the same society under different conditions,
are sometimes diametrically opposed. In Europe and in the United States
to have committed a murder disgraces for all time a man's memory, and
disgraces for generations all who are related to him. By the Pathans,
however, a contrary sentiment is displayed. One who had killed a Mellah
(priest) and failed to find refuge from the avengers, said at length: "I
can but be a martyr; I will go and kill a Sahib." He was hanged after
shooting a sergeant, perfectly satisfied "at having expiated his
offence." The prevailing ethical sentiment in England is such that a man
who should allow himself to be taken possession of and made an
unresisting slave would be regarded with scorn; but the people of
Drekete, a slave-district of Fiji, "said it was their duty to become
food and sacrifices for the chiefs," and that "they were honored by
being considered adequate to such a noble task." Less extreme, though
akin in nature, is the contrast between the feelings which the history
of Englishmen has recorded within a few centuries. In Elizabeth's time,
Sir John Hawkins initiated the slave-trade, and, in commemoration of the
achievement, was allowed to put in his coat-of-arms: "a demi-moor
proper, bound with a cord,"--the honorableness of his action being thus
assumed by himself, and recognized by Queen and public. At the present
day, on the other hand, the making slaves of men, called by Wesley "the
sum of all villanies," is regarded in England with detestation; and for
many years the British government maintained a fleet to suppress the
slave-trade. Again, peoples who have emerged from the primitive
family-and-clan organization, hold that one who is guilty of a crime
must himself bear the punishment, and it is thought extreme injustice
that the punishment should fall upon any one else. The remote ancestors
of the English people thought and felt differently, as do still the
Australians, whose "first great principle with regard to punishment is
that all the relatives of a culprit, in the event of his not being
found, are implicated in his guilt: the brothers of the criminal
conceive themselves to be quite as guilty as he is." Then,
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