o the other detest
their life with good reason, and withdraw themselves out of it.

I think also that this is said by them against common sense, that Nature
herself is indifferent, and yet that it is good to agree with Nature.
For it is not our duty either to follow the law or be persuaded by
argument, unless the law and argument be good and honest. And this
indeed is the least of their errors. But if, as Chrysippus has written
in his First Book concerning Exhortation, a happy life consists only in
living according to virtue, other things (as he says) being nothing to
us, nor cooperating any ways towards it, Nature is not only indifferent,
but foolish also and stupid, in inclining us to such things as belong
nothing to us; and we also are fools in thinking felicity to be an
agreeing with Nature, which draws us after such things as contribute
nothing to happiness. For what can be more agreeable to common sense,
than that, as desirable things are requisite to live commodiously, so
natural things are necessary that we may live according to Nature? Now
these men say not so; but having settled the living according to Nature
for their end, do nevertheless hold those things which are according to
Nature to be indifferent.

Nor is this less repugnant to common sense, that an intelligent and
prudent man should not be equally affected to equal good things, but
should put no value on some, and be ready to undergo and suffer anything
for others, though the things themselves are neither greater nor less
one than another. For they say, It is the same thing to abstain from the
enjoyment of an old woman that is about to die as to take part in the
greatest actions with moderation... since in both cases we do what duty
requires. And yet for this, as a great and glorious thing, they should
be ready to die; when as to boast of the other would be shameful and
ridiculous. And even Chrysippus himself in his commentary concerning
Jupiter, and in the Third Book of the Gods, says, that it were a poor,
absurd, and impertinent thing to glory in such acts, as proceeding
from virtue, as bearing valiantly the stinging of a wasp, or abstaining
chastely from an old woman that lies a dying. Do not they then
philosophize against the common conception, who profess nothing to be
more commendable than those things which yet themselves are ashamed to
praise? For how can that be desirable or to be approved, which is worthy
neither of praise nor admiration, b