ity for circulating credit by paper, from the defect of coin
in this kingdom?

209. Qu. Whether the public may not as well save the interest which
it now pays?

210. Qu. What would happen if two of our banks should break at once?
And whether it be wise to neglect providing against an event which
experience hath shewn us not to be impossible?

211. Qu. Whether such an accident would not particularly affect the
bankers? And therefore whether a national bank would not be a
security even to private bankers?

212. Qu. Whether we may not easily avoid the inconveniencies
attending the paper-money of New England, which were incurred by
their issuing too great a quantity of notes, by their having no
silver in bank to exchange for notes, by their not insisting upon
repayment of the loans at the time prefixed, and especially by their
want of manufactures to answer their imports from Europe?

213. Qu. Whether a combination of bankers might not do wonders, and
whether bankers know their own strength?

214. Qu. Whether a bank in private hands might not even overturn a
government? and whether this was not the case of the Bank of St.
George in Genoa? [Footnote: See the Vindication and Advancement of
our national Constitution and Credit. Printed in London 1710.]

215. Qu. Whether we may not easily prevent the ill effects of such a
bank as Mr Law proposed for Scotland, which was faulty in not
limiting the quantum of bills, and permitting all persons to take
out what bills they pleased, upon the mortgage of lands, whence by a
glut of paper, the prices of things must rise? Whence also the
fortunes of men must increase in denomination, though not in value;
whence pride, idleness, and beggary?

216. Qu. Whether such banks as those of England and Scotland might
not be attended with great inconveniences, as lodging too much power
in the hands of private men, and giving handle for monopolies,
stock-jobbing, and destructive schemes?

217. Qu. Whether the national bank, projected by an anonymous writer
in the latter end of Queen Anne's reign, might not on the other hand
be attended with as great inconveniencies by lodging too much power
in the Government?

218. Qu. Whether the bank projected by Murray, though it partake, in
many useful particulars, with that of Amsterdam, yet, as it placeth
too great power in the hands of a private society, might not be
dangerous to the public?

219. Qu. Whether it be rightly remarked by some that,