dit
depends on secrecy, or in a public management regulated and
inspected by Parliament?
34. Qu. Whether a supine security be not catching, and whether
numbers running the same risk, as they lessen the caution, may not
increase the danger?
35. Qu. What real objection lies against a national bank erected by
the legislature, and in the management of public deputies, appointed
and inspected by the legislature?
36. Qu. What have we to fear from such a bank, which may not be as
well feared without it?
37. Qu. How, why, by what means, or for what end, should it become
an instrument of oppression?
38. Qu. Whether we can possibly be on a more precarious foot than we
are already? Whether it be not in the power of any particular person
at once to disappear and convey himself into foreign parts? or
whether there can be any security in an estate of land when the
demands upon it are unknown?
39. Qu. Whether the establishing of a national bank, if we suppose a
concurrence of the government, be not very practicable?
40. Qu. But, whether though a scheme be never so evidently
practicable and useful to the pubic, yet, if conceived to interfere
with a private interest, it be not forthwith in danger of appearing
doubtful, difficult, and impracticable?
41. Qu. Whether the legislative body hath not already sufficient
power to hurt, if they may be supposed capable of it, and whether a
bank would give them any new power?
42. Qu. What should tempt the pubic to defraud itself?
43. Qu. Whether, if the legislature destroyed the public, it would
not be felo de se; and whether it be reasonable to suppose it bent
on its own destruction?
44. Qu. Whether the objection to a pubic national bank, from want of
secrecy, be not in truth an argument for it?
45. Qu. Whether the secrecy of private banks be not the very thing
that renders them so hazardous? and whether, without that, there
could have been of late so many sufferers?
46. Qu. Whether when all objections are answered it be still
incumbent to answer surmises?
47. Qu. Whether it were just to insinuate that gentlemen would be
against any proposal they could not turn into a job?
48. Qu. Suppose the legislature passed their word for any private
banker, and regularly visited his books, would not money lodged in
his bank be therefore reckoned more secure?
49. Qu. In a country where the legislative body is not fit to be
trusted, what security can there be for trusting
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