ldier, and
is accustomed to find in all Napoleon's campaigns a consistency of plan
which he here looks for in vain. If in his earlier combinations he did
not in every instance take all possibilities into the account, but
overlooked some, this must be ascribed not so much to the want of
military penetration, as to his firm confidence in his good fortune, and
in his ability to turn unforeseen accidents to his own advantage, or at
least to render them harmless. Rarely has a general been so highly
favoured by fortune for a long series of years as he. It is no wonder
then that this confidence at length increased to such a degree as
frequently to become the height of temerity. In Russia, Napoleon met
with many circumstances which he had not taken into his calculation; but
he nevertheless penetrated to Moscow. Here he for the first time
experienced such a reverse as no general ever yet sustained. His immense
army was entirely annihilated. His stern decree created a new one, to
all outward appearance equally formidable. From the haste with which its
component parts were collected, it could not but be deficient in
intrinsic energy, and it was impossible to doubt that this would be
shewn in time. In this respect his antagonists had a decided advantage,
as must have been obvious to him after the battles of Luetzen and
Bautzen. Had he not been so vastly superior in number to the Russian and
Prussian army in the first engagement, he would indisputably have been
defeated on that occasion.--The political relations of Europe had
moreover undergone an extraordinary change. He could not for a thousand
reasons be a moment doubtful of the choice of Austria. If with a strong
and well-appointed army she could not by negotiation bring about a peace
upon the basis of a future balance of power among the principal states
of Europe, in which Prussia and Russia were willing to acquiesce, there
could be no question that for the sake of her own existence she would
espouse the cause of those two powers. This Napoleon seems to have
considered as impossible, or the advantages already obtained must have
inspired him with the confidence that even the accession of Austria to
the alliance could not prevent the prosecution of his victorious career
to the Vistula. Could he have expected to encounter the whole Austrian
army in Silesia, or to reduce the fortresses of Upper Silesia, with such
rapidity as to be able a third time to menace Vienna, and to compel the