y, was locked up in Leipzig.

When in August Austria declared herself decidedly in favour of Russia
and Prussia, it was natural to expect that Napoleon would have totally
relinquished the useless defence of Saxony, and have adopted a new plan
of operations, in order to cover and preserve the other states of the
confederation of the Rhine. That he would infallibly be compelled to
evacuate Saxony, was evident from the slightest inspection of the map.
In this beautiful province he could expect no other glory than that of
plunging it, by his inflexible obstinacy, into the most abject misery.
The combined monarchs had nothing to fear for their own dominions; they
needed to do no more than to carry on for some time a mere war of
observation, and to recruit their forces. They might quietly await the
moment when Napoleon should leave Dresden, and, on his arrival, force
him to a general engagement in any situation which they should deem most
advantageous. Too late did Napoleon resolve upon retreat. He was obliged
to commence it in the midst of an immense quadrangle which the allies
formed about him, and to direct his course towards Leipzig. He could
not, however, yet determine to give up Dresden, but left there a
considerable army, thus weakening himself, and sacrificing it, as well
as the garrisons of the fortresses on the Elbe and Oder, to no purpose
whatever, in case he should lose a battle. At length, near Leipzig, he
was forced, into the arduous conflict. Since the latter half of August,
the talents which he had heretofore displayed for comprehensive and
profound combinations seemed to have totally deserted him. All his
measures and plans appeared imperfect, and betrayed a vacillation which
he had never yet manifested. He seems to have been as uncertain
respecting the strength of his antagonists as in regard to their grand
plan of deciding the fate of the campaign with a single blow.

In the battle of Leipzig we perceive none of that forethought which
characterizes his other engagements. The possibility of losing it seems
never to have entered into his calculations; otherwise he would scarcely
have endeavoured to prevail upon the king of Saxony to repair to Leipzig
to witness his defeat. In the most favourable event he had a right to
anticipate no other result than an unmolested retreat: the allies
however, were producing a very different one from what he expected. Of
this he might have convinced himself so early as the 16t