d the retreat might have been effected with inconsiderable
loss. Such a precaution was the more necessary, as he could not be
ignorant that Bluecher's troops had already gained a march upon him, and
was waiting for him at the Saale. Thus the want of a few paltry wooden
bridges proved as ruinous to the French army as the battle itself. It
lost, solely because it was unprovided with them, great part of its yet
remaining artillery, several thousands of dead, who were mostly drowned,
and a great number of prisoners. It was evident that such a retreat,
conducted without order and without plan, was likely to be attended with
the total destruction of the remnant of the army before it could reach
the Rhine. By the actions on the Unstrut and Saale, at Eisenach and
Hanau, this force was actually so reduced, that, on its arrival at the
Rhine, it must probably have entirely lost its military consequence. How
infinitely inferior is Napoleon in this branch of the military art to
the immortal Moreau, to whom he would have owed everlasting obligations,
had he, at his glorious death, bequeathed to him the transcendent art of
converting retreats into victories!
In regard to boldness, Napoleon certainly belongs to the generals of the
first rank. He has undertaken and executed the rashest enterprises. But,
if the true hero shines with the greatest lustre in misfortune, like
Hannibal and Frederic the Great, Napoleon must be classed far below
them. He abandoned his army in Russia when it had most need of his
assistance; and the reason assigned for this desertion--that
circumstances rendered his presence necessary in France--is by no means
satisfactory to the rigid inquirer. During the seven-years' war, the
more dangerous the situation of the Prussian army, the more Frederic
felt himself bound to continue with it, and to assist it with his
eminent military genius. The campaign of 1813 has clearly proved that
the secret of Napoleon's most decisive victories has consisted in the
art of assailing his opponents with a superior force. Napoleon would be
incapable of attacking with 30,000 men an army of 90,000, posted in an
advantageous position, and defeating it, as Frederic did at Leuthen.
Napoleon, like the Prussian monarch, attempted to penetrate into
Bohemia, a country so dangerous for an army; but what a wretched
business did he make of it, in comparison with the latter! Frederic
waged war that he might conquer peace; Napoleon never wished for
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