lances if possible, or staves at any rate to look like lances--a plan
which will serve alike whether you mean to display your cavalry force
at the halt or are deploying to increase front; in either case,
obviously the bulk and volume of the force, whatever your formation,
will appear increased. Conversely, if the problem be to make large
numbers appear small, supposing you have ground at command adapted to
concealment, the thing is simple: by leaving a portion of your men
exposed and hiding away a portion in obscurity, you may effect your
object. (4) But if the ground nowhere admits of cover, your best course
is to form your files (5) into ranks one behind the other, and wheel
them round so as to leave intervals between each file; the troopers
nearest the enemy in each file will keep their lances erect, and the
rest low enough not to show above.

(3) Cf. Polyaen. II. i. 17, of Agesilaus in Macedonia, 394 B.C. (our
author was probably present); IV. iv. 3, of Antipater in Thessaly,
323 B.C.

(4) Lit. "steal your troopers." See "Cyrop." V. iv. 48.

(5) Lit. "form your decads (squads of ten; cf. our 'fours') in ranks
and deploy with intervals."

To come to the next topic: you may work on the enemy's fears by the
various devices of mock ambuscades, sham relief parties, false
information. Conversely, his confidence will reach an overweening
pitch, if the idea gets abroad that his opponents have troubles of
their own and little leisure for offensive operations.

But over and beyond all that can be written on the subject--inventiveness
is a personal matter, beyond all formulas--the true general must be able
to take in, deceive, decoy, delude his adversary at every turn, as the
particular occasion demands. In fact, there is no instrument of war more
cunning than chicanery; (6) which is not surprising when one reflects
that even little boys, when playing, "How many (marbles) have I got in
my hand?" (7) are able to take one another in successfully. Out goes a
clenched fist, but with such cunning that he who holds a few is thought
to hold several; or he may present several and appear to be holding only
a few. Is it likely that a grown man, giving his whole mind to methods
of chicanery, will fail of similar inventiveness? Indeed, when one comes
to consider what is meant by advantages snatched in war, one will find,
i think, that the greater part of them, and those the more important,
must be attributed in some