ely to be caught by the steel fifty
years later, when he could kill at two thousand yards instead of two
hundred, or failing to kill, had hours instead of minutes in which to
gain his pony and disappear. Yet the long-range rifle had improved his
weapon of retreat until it had become a danger instead of an aid to
his cause. Failing so completely to understand the military value of
self-sacrifice, that he actually pitied, and slightly despised it,
when he saw it resorted to by his enemies, his refusal to risk his
life often proved disastrous to his side at times when more resolution
might have turned the scale of battle in his favour.

There was much to be admired in the Boer defensive; up to a certain
point it was stubborn and dangerous. The musketry from a position,
poured upon zones of ground over which the British troops must pass
rather than upon the troops themselves, was heavy and effective, and
not easily quelled by bombardment. In battle, artillery may do its
work without causing a casualty; but so long as he had cover for his
body, the soul of the Boer rifleman was little shaken by the bursting
of projectiles; fierce firing came often from portions of a position
which appeared to be smothered by shrapnel, and invisible in the reek
of exploding lyddite.

[Sidenote: Special habits of fighting.]

Nor did the Boer armies, as regular armies have done, cling to strong
positions simply because they were strong. They considered a position
as a means to an end, and if it ceased to be the best, they discarded
it without hesitation, no matter with what toil it had been prepared.
Nevertheless, on ground of their own choosing, the abandonment without
a shot of strong, laboriously entrenched, positions by no means always
meant retirement. Much as they dreaded being enveloped, their flanks,
or what would have been the flanks of an European army, might be
threatened again and again only to be converted each time into new and
formidable fronts. The nature of the country, and the comparative
mobility of the opposing forces rendered these rapid changes of front
easy of execution, but they demanded promptness, and a genius for the
appreciation of the value of ground, not only on the part of the Boer
leaders, but also on that of the rank and file. In the ranks of the
commandos persuasion had to take the place of word of command; the
Boer soldier, before he quitted one position for another, had to be
convinced of the necessity for