though the attack staggered, or even
recoiled, upon the bullet-swept glacis, and victory trembled in the
balance.

[Sidenote: A weakness in attack.]

If the Boer defensive was force passive, their general attack became
force dissipated as soon as it entered the medium rifle zone.
Excessive individuality marked its every stage, the thought of victory
seldom held the first place. In the old days, when an assault had to
be attempted, as at Thaba Bosigo and Amajuba, it had been the custom
to call for volunteers. But when President Kruger pitted his burghers
against large armies, this expedient was no longer available; instead
of a few score such affairs required thousands, and they were not
forthcoming. The desire to close, the only spirit which can compel
decisive victory, entered into the Boer fighting philosophy even less
than the desire to be closed with; the non-provision of bayonets was
no careless omission on the part of their War department. During an
assault the Commandants might set, as they often did, a splendid
example of courage, but they could never rely on being followed to the
end by more than a fraction of their men. The attack, therefore, of
the Boers differed from that of a force of regulars in that it was
never made in full strength, and was never pushed home; and from that
of the Afghans, Afridis or Soudanese in that there was no strong body
of spectators to rush forward and assure the victory half won by the
bolder spirits in front. Their attack was, in consequence, little to
be feared, so long as the defence was well covered from the incessant
rifle fire which supported and accompanied it; for none but a few
gallant individuals would ever venture to close upon a trench or
sangar whose defenders yet remained alive behind it. Both in attack
and defence, therefore, the Boer army lacked the last essentials to
victory.

[Sidenote: As partisans.]

It was in the warfare of the partisan that the Boer excelled, in the
raid on a post or convoy, the surprise and surrounding of a
detachment, the harassing of the flanks and the rear of a column, and
the dash upon a railway. Their scouting has not often been excelled;
their adversaries seldom pitched or struck a camp unwatched, or
marched undogged by distant horsemen. How little the Boer generals and
Intelligence department knew how to utilise the fruits of this
constant watchfulness will be fully shown elsewhere, but the lack of
deductive power on the part