region so vast and diversified as South Africa; but its
dominant feature is undoubtedly the great central plateau comprising
southern Rhodesia, all the Transvaal, except a narrow fringe on the
eastward, the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the Orange Free State, and
the northern and central portions of Cape Colony. Westward this
tableland slopes gradually and imperceptibly to sea level; to the
south it reaches the Atlantic in the series of terraces and
escarpments already described. Eastward it is shut in by the
Drakensberg, whose spurs, projecting to the Indian Ocean, traverse at
right angles Natal, Zululand, Swaziland, and Portuguese East Africa.

[Sidenote: Effect on operations of plateau.]

Upon the central South African plateau tactical and strategical
success is dependent upon rapid manoeuvring. Positions are so readily
turned that they can seldom be resolutely held. It is difficult,
therefore, to bring an evasive enemy to decisive action, and the
fruits of victory must chiefly be plucked by pursuit. The horse is as
important as the man, and the infantry arm is reduced to the position
of a first reserve, or to the _role_ of piquets on the lines of
communication, which remain always open to attack. Superior numbers
and, above all, superior speed, are irresistible. There are no
first-class physical obstacles; the rivers, excepting only the Orange
and the Vaal, are, as a rule, fordable; the hill features for the most
part insignificant or easy to mask. Mobility is thus at once the
chief enemy and aid to military success.

[Sidenote: and of lower spurs.]

But on the stairway descending from the south of this plateau, and on
the spurs reaching up from the coast on the east, all this is
reversed. The approach of an army acting on the offensive, uphill or
across the series of ridges, is commanded by so many points, that a
small number of defenders can readily arrest its advance. Position
leads but to position, and these, prolonged almost indefinitely on
either flank, are not readily turned, or, if turned, still offer
locally a strong frontal defence, should the enemy be sufficiently
mobile to reach them in time. Streamlets, which would be negligible on
the plateau, become formidable obstacles in their deep beds. The
horseman's occupation is greatly limited, for he can neither
reconnoitre nor gallop. Marches must, therefore, be made painfully in
battle formation, for every advance may entail an action. Thus
strategy is gr