ng them Flahault, at London, followed him into
retirement and foreign affairs were temporarily in confusion[771]. The
Emperor was away from Paris and all that Cowley reported was that the
last time he had seen Thouvenel the latter had merely remarked that "as
soon as the Emperor came back the two Governments ought to enter into a
serious consideration of the whole question[772]...." Cowley himself was
more concerned that it was now becoming clear France, in spite of
previous protestations, was planning "colonizing" Mexico[773].

Up to the end of September, therefore, the British Government, while
wholly confident that France would agree in any effort whatsoever that
England might wish to make, had no recent assurances, either official or
private, to this effect. This did not disturb Russell, who took for
granted French approval, and soon he cast aside the hesitation caused by
the doubts of Granville, the opposition of Lewis, and the caution of
Palmerston. Public opinion was certainly turning toward a demand for
Ministerial action[774]. Two days of further consideration caused him to
return to the attack; October 4 he wrote Palmerston:

"I think unless some miracle takes place this will be the
very time for offering mediation, or as you suggest,
proposing to North and South to come to terms.

"Two things however must be made clear:

(i) That we propose separation,

(ii) That we shall take no part in the war unless attacked
ourselves[775]."

How Russell proposed to evade a war with an angry North was not made
clear, but in this same letter notice was given that he was preparing a
memorandum for the Cabinet. Russell was still for a mediation on lines
of separation, but his uncertainty, even confusion, of mind became
evident but another two days later on receipt of a letter from Stuart,
written September 23, in which he and Mercier were now all for a
suggestion of armistice, with no mention of separation[776]. Russell
now thought:

"If no fresh battles occur, I think the suggestion might be
adopted, tho' I am far from thinking with Mercier that the
North would accept it. But it would be a fair and defensible
course, leaving it open to us to hasten or defer recognition
if the proposal is declined. Lord Lyons might carry it over
on the 25th[777]."

British policy, as represented by the inclinations of the Foreign
Secretary, having started out on a cour