sferred to France. That Mason did not fully
concur in this as final, easily as it was accepted by Slidell, is
evident from his later correspondence with Lindsay and Spence. He
regarded the question of British recognition of the South as mainly an
English political question, pinning his hopes on a Tory overthrow of
Palmerston's Ministry. This he believed to depend on the life of the
Prime Minister and his anxious inquiries as to the health of Palmerston
were frequent. Nothing in his instructions indicated a desired course of
action and Mason after consulting Slidell and, naturally, securing his
acquiescence, determined to remain in Europe waiting events.

If the South was indignant at British inaction the North was
correspondingly pleased and after the seizure of the Laird Rams was
officially very friendly--at least so Lyons reported[1117]. In this same
private letter, however, Lyons ventured a strong protest against a
notion which now seems to have occurred to Russell of joint action by
England, France and Spain to withdraw belligerent rights _to the North_,
unless the United States formally "concede to their enemy the status of
a Belligerent for all _international_ purposes." Why or how this idea
came to be taken up by Russell is uncertain. Possibly it was the result
of irritation created by the persistence of Seward in denying that the
war was other than an effort to crush rebellious subjects--theory
clearly against the fact yet consistently maintained by the American
Secretary of State throughout the entire war and constantly causing
difficulties in relations with neutral countries. At any rate Lyons was
quick to see the danger. He wrote:

"Such a declaration might produce a furious outburst of wrath
from Government and public here. It cannot, however, be
denied that the reasoning on which the Declaration would be
founded would be incontrovertible, and that in the end
firmness answers better with the Americans than coaxing. But
then England, France and Spain must be really firm, and not
allow their Declaration to be a _brutum fulmen_. If on its
being met, as it very probably would be, by a decided refusal
on the part of the United States, they did not proceed to
break up the Blockade, or at all events to resist by force
the exercise of the right of visit on the high seas, the
United States Government and people would become more
difficult to deal with