a conveyancer is instructed to draw a will which appears to him
unjust, he must feel some pain in so doing; but it is not a pain of
conscience, for it is not his office to compel people to make equitable
wills. It is an office which, at the distance he stands from the parties,
and with his limited knowledge of their character and mutual
relationships, he could not possibly undertake; he would be a mere
disturber of the peace of society if he attempted to regulate the morality
of all the conveyances and testaments that he drew. It would indeed be a
doctrine destructive of all order, and of the very machinery of society,
that would, as a general rule, impose upon men of profession, or of trade,
the responsibilities which lie, in the first instance, upon the
consciences of their clients. A man could not sell a piece of whipcord
from his shop, without having an assurance from the customer that he was
not buying it to strangle his wife withal. The conveyancer, therefore,
quietly pursues his instructions, and draws the will. In the like manner,
if a barrister is instructed to plead the statute of limitations to a
debt, it is no concern of his if the client is not acting in a
conscientious manner in taking advantage of the statute. The law gives him
this plea, and it is not for the jurist to debar him the use of it. He
presents it, therefore, to the court. But if, not content with pleading
the statute of limitations for a client who employs the law to escape from
a moral obligation, he labours to convince the jury that, in availing
himself of this plea, his client is acting in a very honourable, or at
least in no blamable manner; if, by an artful colouring of the facts, or
by insinuations against other parties, he contrives to lead the culprit in
triumph through the court, then we say that a baseness is committed by the
advocate, for which there is no excuse, in the constitution of courts of
justice, nor in the subtleties of casuistry.

Those who have expatiated on the duty of the barrister to _do all_ for his
client, be that client whom he may, have generally taken care to place
before us the cases of political prosecution, where the advocate appears
to act a brave and generous part in opposing the government and the legal
officers of the crown. By dexterously keeping the small cases in view
while they were enlarging on the broad principle of indiscriminate
advocacy, they have often contrived to give to this principle itself an