and
of _evidence_ have been lately much simplified and improved, and they
will, year after year, be still further improved; but they still furnish
the willing or the unwilling advocate with abundant obstructions to the
fair investigation of truth. Speaking of pleading, Mr Warren has very
truly said, in a passage we have already quoted--"It is continually a
matter of serious difficulty to refer a particular combination of facts to
their appropriate legal category; and, if the wrong one should be
selected, substantial justice is sacrificed before arbitrary legal
technicality." A glance at these "legal categories" will fully bear out
the statement which our author has here so temperately made. Let us open
the justly lauded book of Mr Stephen, "On the Principles of Pleading"--a
work which every man, lawyer or not, who receives a gratification from
clear and logical statements, may take pleasure in perusing. We extract
the following account of _personal actions_:--

"Of personal actions, the most common are the following--Debt, covenant,
detinue, trespass, trespass on the case, replevin.

"The action of _debt_ lies where a party claims the recovery of a debt,
_i. e._ a liquidated or certain sum of money alleged to be due to him.

"The action of _covenant_ lies where a party claims damages for a breach
of covenant, _i. e. of a promise under seal_.

"The action of _detinue_ lies where the party claims the specific recovery
of goods and chattels, or deeds and writings detained from him.

"The action of _trespass_ lies where a party claims damages for a trespass
against him. A trespass is an injury _committed with violence_."

Having described these, the author comes to one which requires to have its
history told before it can be rendered intelligible. This is still not
unfrequently the case in our law; instead of a definition founded on the
nature of things, and growing out of the science itself of jurisprudence,
we are presented with a narrative to tell us how the matter came about.

"The action of _trespass on the case_ lies where a party sues for damages
for any wrong or cause of complaint to which covenant or trespass will not
apply. This action originated in the power given by the statute of
Westminster 2, to the clerks of the chancery to frame new writs _in
consimili casu_ with writs already known.... Such being the nature of the
action, it comprises, of course, many different species. There are two,
however, of mor