ury, is again a matter of no small difficulty. Moreover,
in order to sustain trespass, the property injured must be of a
_corporeal_ nature. It would be a sad solecism in the eye of the law to
allow a man to bring trespass on account of his _tithes_--this being,
according to definition, an _incorporeal_ property, and from its nature,
therefore, not subject to violence.

This barbarous nomenclature of actions might be swept away at once with
considerable advantage. If the plaintiff "complaining" of the defendant,
proceeded at once to a brief statement of his cause of action, this would
answer all the purposes of pleading. It was said by the commissioners in
the third report on the common law, that an abolition of these
distinctions would entail "much uncertainty on the right of action." With
utmost deference to the commissioners, this is a very strange assertion.
These categories are known only to the lawyers; and surely a student of
the law cannot be at a loss to distinguish the substantial ground of
action from a mere formulary of pleading. A layman may often imagine he
has a right of action where he has none. Did the commissioners mean
gravely to assert that these categories, of which he knows nothing--or
whether he knows them or not--could enlighten him as to the redress he is
entitled to in a court of justice?

It is, however, in the inexhaustible armoury of quibble and objection
which the law of _evidence_ supplies him with that the generous advocate
must feel the greatest amount of embarrassment and repugnance. It is his
office to stand at the door of testimony, and thrust back every witness,
and reject every document, he can, upon pleas which, whatever their
original ground or design, he very well knows do not impeach the real
value of the evidence rejected. But into this topic we must not enter. It
is not our present object to write upon the reform of the laws. The
subject would lead us much too far.

One general remark only we will venture to make. Neither in nor out of the
profession must men yet be impatient with the frequent changes that our
laws undergo. Though, in common with our author, we estimate highly a
settled state of things, and have to deprecate the rashness of some too
hasty legislators, we cannot yet "lay aside the knife." They are very
inconvenient these partial changes, but there is no other mode of
proceeding. Whilst we are living in the very city which we have to
improve, and in great part